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Introduction: Fluke Fisheries in RI Anecdotal Evidence Evaluation of the pilot program
Current management scheme
 Federal government allocates TAC to the states.
 RI Department of Environmental Management (DEM)
allocates quota to three sub-periods.
Æ Winter I [Jan-April], Summer [May-Oct], Winter II [Nov-Dec]
 Daily landings were restricted by the “possession limit” (aka daily trip limit).
Æ Varies from 50lbs/day to 3,000lbs/week.
 Fishery closes when the sub-period quota is reached, and reopens the next sub-period.
Introduction: Fluke Fisheries in RI Anecdotal Evidence
TAC for sector
Common pool fluke 
fishery closed
Cumulative Landing of Fluke by Sector Vessels
Evaluation of the pilot program
Focus on the Revenue of Sector and Non-sector Vessels for 2009
 Fluke is divided into four market categories (jumbo, large, medium, other).
 Cost analysis is in progress.
Challenge1: Estimating Counterfactual
 Need to estimate what the 2009 season would have been without the sector program.
Challenge 2: Estimating Effects on Other Targeted Species
 Based on the landing history of sector vessels, we included 20 other non-fluke species.
Inefficiencies of current scheme
 Regulatory discards due to low possession limits.
 Forced to go out almost everyday due to low possession limits
Æ safety issues.
 Derby fishing. 
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Based on the landing history of sector vessels, we included 20 other non fluke species.
Methodology Overview
 Used SAFIS data from 2005-09 (price, species, market grade, vessel, dealer, day, etc)
 Reduced form estimation of 24 demand functions (4 fluke categories & 20 species).
Ex-vessel price is the dependent variable.
 Estimated functions were used to predict the actual daily prices Æ factual revenues.
 For counterfactual, each sector vessel was matched to three non-sector vessels based
on landing shares by species and number of fished days in 2008, and vessel attributes.






TAC for 2009: 1.68 M lbs
April 2009: RI Fluke Sector Pilot Program launched
 8 vessels (7 trawlers, 1 gillnet) formed a sector
“Rhode Island Fluke Conservation Cooperative (RIFCC)”
 Received 11.53% of RI TAC (176,370 lbs) based on catch history.
 Internally managed as IFQ.
Not without controversies
 “Smaller non-sector boats will be pushed out”
 “Sector vessels will land large amount, driving down fluke price.”
 RI Fisheries Management Council voted against (4-3); RI DEM 
director overturned and gave a go-sign.
Sector pilot launched
Sector vessels focused fluke landings when common pool fishery was closed.
 Fluke caught in other dates are mostly by-catch.
 When common pool fishery was open, sector vessels targeted cod, dogfish, monkfish, whiting, and 
squid.
Source: RI DEM (2009)
sector pilot program.
 Sector vessels’ 2009 counterfactual landings were calculated using the actual landing
data of matched non-sector vessels.

























































Other species total for 2008
Matching “Fit” Using 2008 Data 
d e c t o o et u e da dg a eag osg
Main Research Questions







Î Behaviors that were 
restricted under the current 
management scheme, but 
became possible with sector 
program.
Average ex-vessel price for fluke indicates above strategy yielded positive result.






CP Open CP Closed
2005 2.81 -- 2.62 2.71
2006 30 5 30 5 26 4
































































Si Et i t St Non-sector Non-sector
Estimation Results
Actual, predicted, and counterfactual average revenues of 2009











Nearer = fresher Avoid market glut
pg
Did sector vessels actually 
engage in these behaviors?
Did they pay off?
2006 3.05 -- 3.05 2.64
2007 3.73 -- 3.71 2.94
2008 3.96 4.07 2.80
2009 3.33 4.00 3.25 2.48
Source: Data from SAFIS. Calculated by authors.
o CP = common pool fluke fishery.
o All seven sector trawlers are federally permitted. As such, federally permitted non-sector vessels serve
better for comparison




Fluke Actual $ 92,607 $ 31,208 $ 2,181
Predicted factual $ 89,151 $ 32,024 $ 2,032
Counterfactual $ 76,856 $ 30,669 $ 2,038
Other Actual $ 285,775 $ 220,979 $ 6,159
Predicted factual $ 297,234 $ 213,913 $ 6,068
Counterfactual $ 212,589 $ 211,595 $ 6,046 Are non-sector members made worse-off?
 Fluke: could benefit from sector program through reduced total 
landings when the fishery is open.
 Other fisheries: could be adversely affected as sector vessels 
landed other species while fluke is open to non-sector boats.
Net impact is an 
empirical question.
better for comparison.
o State licensed boats (non-federal permit holders) are typically small, operates mainly during the summer
when fluke migrates nearshore, and often part-time commercial fishermen. Although not directly
comparable to sector vessels, these fishermen expressed strong concerns about the pilot program.
o All non-sector boats included made at least 10 trips in 2009 and had less than 10% of
their landing volume made up by lobster.
Distributional effect of changes in revenues among non-sector boats
Non-sector 
vessel type
Share (%) Average amount ($)
Rev. increase Rev. decrease Rev. increase Rev. decrease Rev. change
Fed. Permit 52.4% 47.6% $4,276 -$925 $1,797
State lic 47 4% 52 6% $121 $79 $16
Conclusion
Are sector members better-off? Î YES.
S t l t t d fl k h l fl k fi h l d (ti i h i )
Need more analysis on distributional effects. 
Pl ii l t h t h t f b t h t t b t hl f f t h bt t ff d th State lic. 47.4% 52.6% $121 -$79 $16
o These numbers are preliminary and still in progress.
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 Sector vessels targeted fluke when common pool fluke fishery season was closed (timing choice).
This strategy yielded substantially higher ex-vessel price.
 Sector vessels earned on average $12,295 more from fluke, and $84,645 more from other species.
 RI DEM estimated significant drop in discards (60.6lbs/tow in 2008 Æ 1.9lbs/tow in 2009 (RI DEM 2009)).
Are non-sector members made worse-off? Î Minimal, if any.
 Federally permitted vessels were on average made better-off in both fluke and other species fisheries.
 Smaller scale state license boats did not gain much, but also did not lose much.
 Preliminary results show that for both non-sector types about half of them were better-off and the
other half were made worse-off.
 The magnitude of change, however, was much larger for those who were made better-off.
In-progress and future research
 Cost analysis
 Expand analysis to New England region-wide catch share system.